The Appropriation of Innocence: from Shelley’s *Frankenstein* to Ahmed Saadawi’s *Frankenstein in Baghdad*

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates the appropriation of innocence in Shelley’s *Frankenstein, Or the Modern Prometheus* (1818) and *Frankenstein in Baghdad* (2013) by Ahmed Saadawi. These novels are selected because the latter appropriates the creator and creature characters and contextualizes them into the American-Iraq 2005 post-war period. In Shelley’s *Frankenstein*, Victor Frankenstein, scientifically, gives life to a dead body amalgamated from other body parts, which start murdering and revenging upon his creator. Whereas, in Saadawi’s twenty-first century *Frankenstein*, a person who is formed from others’ dead bodies by merely a junk dealer, starts murdering and revenging upon other people. On the one hand, Frankenstein, a science student, sought to answer the question of human revival theoretically and practically. Therefore, after he resurrects the dead, it becomes monstrous due to its negligence and physical hideousness by its creator. On the other hand, the Iraqi Frankenstein’s creator, Hadi, celebrates collecting old materials in a non-scientific manner, including humans’ dead body parts, in order to give value to them by offering them worthy of proper burials. The resurrected creatures transform into more powerful beings than their creators as reactions against isolation and injustice. For that, both Frankenstein and Hadi lose control over their creations, who instigate new life cycles. Hence, the ethical responsibility of invention underlies the concept of innocence which this paper intends to analyze vis-à-vis the creators and their creations.

Keywords: Ahmed Saadawi, Baghdad, Frankenstein in Baghdad, innocence, Shelley, Victor Frankenstein

Introduction

Due to his curiosity in the sciences, particularly chemistry, anatomy, and philosophy, regarding questions about life, death, and immortality, Victor Frankenstein becomes the creator of a humanoid creation in Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* called the monster several other notorious and scary names. Frankenstein’s scientific passion dates back to his childhood when he was only thirteen years old. He profoundly self-studied the sciences and meticulously read scientific books such as Cornelius Agrippa, Albertus, Magnus, and Paracelsus (Shelley, 1992, p. 40). Surprisingly, when he was only fifteen years old and stayed at a home near Belrive, he accidentally observed a dreadful thunder advancing from the Jura Mountains at night. The mighty thunder beheld his imagination for its intensity, fear and sublimity as he puts it:

and as soon as the dazzling light vanished, the oak had disappeared, and nothing remained but a blasted stump. When we visited it the next morning, we found the tree shattered in a singular manner. It was not splintered by the shock, but entirely reduced to thin ribbons of wood (Shelley, 1992, p. 40).

This sensational experience and the era’s curiosity for the sciences encouraged him to join the University of Ingolstadt in Ingolstadt to learn and research the liberal sciences under the supervision of notable professors Waldman and Krempe.

The society where Victor lives, on the first hand, is preoccupied with the ethical permissibility of creating a life or a living creature! The denial of such a science was buttressed by the impossibility of generating other creatures because this was simply considered to be playing God. In addition, the same society is confronted with science and its firm and constant advancements as perceived as an antithetical force to religion. Victor Frankenstein adventurously appears to side with the latter in such a society that is caught between the conflicting forces of religious and scientific claims and purposes. After painstaking and laborious endeavours of two years put into practice for the resurrection of a dead body, Victor’s creation opens his eyes, stands up, and walks. Then, his creation turns to be a monster that Victor regrets creating after witnessing the horrific consequences following that moment. The creator innocently intends to resurrect a man merely as a proof of the capacity of science to make man immortal, not to craft a person who will later turn into a monster.

Additionally, the beast is not, furthermore, consciously or intentionally engendered as a monster. Still, his life material conditions transform him into a monster in which both the creators can be considered innocent. Therefore, the concept of innocence, which is also intertwined with guilt, is reproduced in both novels.

On the other hand, though *Frankenstein in Baghdad* 2013 as a text is fiction, it is deeply rooted in the Iraq actual post-war situation or occupation, particularly Baghdad by the U.S. military and its coalition forces. The novel is set during the summer of 2005 in Baghdad: the capital city. Opposite the post-invasion phase, this city was full of life and co-existence despite the hundreds of miseries under the dictatorship of the Ba’ath Regime. That has been replaced by explosions, sectarian conflicts, terroristic activities, and instabilities in politics and economics, which resulted
in more than one million lives. Based on a research article titled ‘Violent deaths of Iraqi civilians, 2003–2008: analysis by perpetrator, weapon, time, and location’, it is stated that:

We analysed the Iraq Body Count database of 92,614 Iraqi civilian direct deaths from armed violence occurring from March 20, 2003, through March 19, 2008, of which Unknown perpetrators caused 74% of deaths (68,396), Coalition forces 12% (11,516), and Anti-Coalition forces 11% (9,954), (Hicks, 2011, p. 1).

Baghdad population had ceased to think about a developed and luxurious life with advancements in science, technology, and civilization due to the metamorphosis of the situation after 2003. This country which has always been considered one of the essential cradles of human development and progress, is transformed into a horrific theatre of violence and turmoil. Regarding the appropriation of the character and the creation in Frankenstein in Baghdad, Hadi, a junk dealer in the Iraqi capital city, continuously collects dead body parts as the remnants of hundreds of blown-up bodies in 2005 Baghdad explosions to save them from being discarded as rubbish humbly. He completes the entire body one day by stitching the nose as the only and last missing part of it. One morning, Hadi gets up and finds out that the body he has created is gone away. This manufactured man, then called Whatsitsname for the lack of a specific identity as the name refers to no particular characteristics, becomes a killer. This was because all the body parts that have constituted him or Whatsitsname had suffered particular atonement when they were alive. Hadi envisaged and heartedly believed that his creation was “made up of the body parts of people who had been killed, plus the soul of another victim, and had been given the name of yet another victim” (p. 125). Therefore, the same conceptions and doubts spinning around the subject of innocence are appropriated as it profoundly occupies this text.

The second and third parts of this paper concentrate on the innocence of the creator and the creature, respectively. While chapter three, on the contrary, demonstrates their being guilty from other sides. This fundamental basis of Frankenstein, Or the Modern Prometheus, even though it has been appropriated in Frankenstein in Baghdad even though it was written after 223 years from the former publication.

**Literature Review**

Innocence is the central notion of this research which can in the meantime be considered as a significant interplay between both novels that Saadawi appropriates it from Shelley’s work. Hence, it is necessary to understand ‘appropriation,’ and the appropriation of innocence. Karzan Mahmood (2021) claims that “the concept of appropriation and adaptation was first coined after the theory of intertextuality has been formulated by Julia Kristeva and Mikhail Bakhtin” (2021, p. 189). Kristeva, for instance, states vividly that “a text is a permutation of texts, an intertextuality in the space of a given text, in which several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another” (Allen, 2011, p. 11). Bakhtin, in addition, believes that no one has absolute possession of a ‘word’ because half of it is someone else’s; it can be merely owned when it is utilized by a speaker or writer serving his/her specific intention (Mahmood, 2021, p. 189). As a result, the notion of innocence is an essential concept appropriated from Shelley by Saadawi, which firmly bridges both examined texts. One of the features of ‘innocence’ in these works is that
they are intertwined in the grey zone of controversiality between the binary positions of guilt and innocence; that is why this research sets the task to defend the innocence of the major characters. Nevertheless, innocence has become more apparent in the later work, particularly in the sense that the Iraqi creation fights against injustice, military, sectarian violence and gives voice to the killed Iraqi innocents to struggle for themselves. Side by side, the British invention is constructed in an ugly and socially denied appearance and thrown into the midst of deprivation, lack of food, shelter, love and care.

In ‘Adaptation and Appropriation’ (2015), Sanders claims that appropriation is an act of departure from one source text to the target one by adapting to the new context and culture (p. 26). In investigating the former novel, one can conceive that the book resides in the scientific-social British nineteenth-century context, while the latter occurs in the Iraqi post-war 2003.

Therefore, this research concentrates on the notion of innocence in both texts in light of appropriation. First, this work will examine the innocence of the creators; and it will secondly probe the innocence of the creations.

**Discussion**

**Innocence of the Creators**

Despite their relative irrelevance and influence, both novels, the creators, Victor Frankenstein and Hadi, share the same concept or ground of innocence. In both cases, the creators are innocent because, indeed, they do not intend to be malicious people and their purposes are not to claim or harm anyone. For instance, Victor plans to answer one of the most substantial questions throughout human history about the animation of the dead by the power of science, particularly by resurrecting a dead body that is not intended or even does not seem harmful. In this regard, he gives his rest and health to the quest of what he states: “I had worked hard for nearly two years, for the sole purpose of infusing life into an inanimate body” (Shelley, 1992, p. 56).

In addition, Hadi wants to collect body parts of dead people torn apart by the explosions in Baghdad to respect them as normal humans, such as creatures worthy of natural death and burial. He, in reply to Mahmoud, utters the purpose of his collection of the dead body parts: “I made it complete so it wouldn’t be treated as trash, so it would be respected like other dead people and given a proper burial” (Saadawi, 2017, p. 25).

Concerning such purposes, one may not blame Victor and Hadi because they merely aim to give respect and honour to human lives. Further, they prefer life over death as in the former novel; it regards man worthier to live rather than die, let alone death which turns out untimely and unfair. Therefore, in this sense, resurrection is not just a scientific passion, but one wished for the loved ones as demise can put an end to their lives, which can hurt others profoundly. Hadi’s high value given to old radios, sofas or furniture, in regards with the latter, when it transcends to human reimbursement it becomes more precious because it depresses him. The actual example is that when he perceives the Iraqis blown up, torn apart, and mixed in the streets and treated like trash by the government which are to be thrown after their bodies are scattered in the streets as flesh or meat pieces are spread over in a butchery. Thus, he embarks on recomposing them in a complete body in order, at least, to bestow them with worthy burial like the rest of the people after they die.
of any cause regardless of bombs. As a result, both creators are innocent due to wishing and practising the fulfilment of an impossibility or duty beyond human capacity and permission. For this, they pay a high price for their lives, from losing their loved ones to putting their lives at risk.

It is conspicuous that the creator feels mesmerized and freighted when he notices the moment that the creature opened his eyes for the first time. This infers that what the creator imagined or expected in the outset is not what he sees now, even though this is the actual moment of the realisation of his dream. From an external observer, this instant of animation can be conceived as one beyond the creator’s passion since he is frightened to the extent that he never wished to see his body being resurrected. To help better understand this shock or rupture in his pre-and post-creation process, Frankenstein argues that the nature of human feelings is that they are more capricious than the changes in life occurrences. The reason for reaching a conclusion like this about the nature of human feelings changeability, in his perspective, is not due to the modification in the actual life incidents but in the nature of feelings itself. One can interpret this as a justification for his unpredictability in accomplishing his goal and the changes in his feelings as a reaction to the moment the indispensable discovery has been, indeed, actualized. The effect of the scene was to an extreme extent that he states: “but now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart. Unable to endure the aspect of the being I had created, I rushed out of the room and continued a long time traversing my bed-chamber, unable to compose my mind to sleep” (Shelley, 1992, p. 56). Doctor Frankenstein admits that the beauty of his dream could not withstand the terror of the animation moment of the creature. According to Edmund Burke, this feeling of terror or danger experience can be interpreted as the sublimity in the observation or experiment in his revolutionary act of sparking life into a dead body as Burke (1998) states:

No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear. For fear being an apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a manner that resembles actual pain. Whatever therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is sublime too, whether this cause of terror, be endued with greatness of dimensions or not; for it is impossible to look on anything as trifling, or contemptible, that may be dangerous. There are many animals, who though far from being large, are yet capable of raising ideas of the sublime, because they are considered as objects of terror (p. 53).

However, before witnessing or experiencing any real danger on the side of the creature, he was filled with fear and repugnance. This spark of horror originating from the producer's core marks the commencement of a battle or miscommunication with his product. Thus, this rupture or sudden change from positive to negative feelings about his project before and after the moment of waking up as the tipping point can justify his innocence of any unprecedented horrifying consequences. This instance of one’s product of his labor turning against his creator could theoretically be as fearful as God’s creator to oppose his will, or as in Marx’s interpretation that the product will alienate its manufacturer as the product denies him and surrenders to the power of the market and the capitalist.
This refers to what he visualized or imagined as his creator as a remarkable discovery that was entirely dissimilar to reality, which becomes an actual tenacious fight to him and brings him endless suffering. Perhaps as Wittgenstein once said “the limits of my language mean the limits of world” (Wittgenstein, 1961, 68), the limits of the creator’s imagination are the limits of merely his creation’s first movement regardless of the following miseries after that moment. As Wittgenstein believes that language restricts man and his world understanding due to its power in shaping him and his world, this moment, due to its power, as well, entralls the creator to the degree of reducing him and his world to mere horror and revulsion. This could be because, during the pursuit of such or similar scientific discoveries, one completely immerses in an inherent and subjective goal without considering or predicting where the discovery will lead. Doctor Frankenstein dedicates himself to that project for two years enthusiastically; however, the experience, by manifesting contradictions, perplexes him because what he wishes to accomplish is never what he witnesses later. The moment of infusing a spark of life into his creation baffles him as it appears in the paragraph below:

His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful! Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but this luxuriance only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun-white sockets in which they were set, his shrivelled complexion and straight black lips (Shelley, 1992, p. 56).

Nevertheless, the intention of the junk dealer, Hadi, compared to the goal of animating a dead body by Victor Frankenstein in the process of completing one whole body, is vastly a similar ambition because he likewise seeks to combine and recompose the body parts employing stitching to make the entire body and prepare it for a proper burial. The novelist, Sa’adawi, narrates this section of the story as that Hadi does not wish the bodies and souls of the Iraqis to be separated from their souls due to treating them as rubbish after the city bombs blow them up. This soul-body separation, for Hadi, means that the souls will not be ordained to meet their bodies again in the heaves. Thus, the body parts are pursued and amalgamated for the worthy burial by the creator. This is, in addition, meant to oppose the disintegration of the Iraqi citizens as a representation of the opposition if the disintegration occasioned by the US-Iraq invasion or war.

For instance, Hasib, twenty-one years old, who had been employed only for seven months as the guard of a hotel, one day, encountered a Sudanese suicide bomber who flooded into the hotel with driving a dynamite-laden garbage truck. The bomber wanted to break into the hotel and blast the truck in the heart of it to turn the entire well-standing hotel into mere ash. But either bravery or duty, or perhaps both, pushed Hasib to start shooting the truck driver consistently. As a result, he caused the truck driver to blow up the truck earlier. The driver blew it up in the gate and killed Hasib. The only things left after Hasib’s death are the following:

His civilian clothes, a new pair of socks, a bottle of cologne, and the first volume of alSayyab’s collected poems. They put his burned black shoes; his shredded, bloodstained clothes; and small charred parts of his body into his coffin. There was little left of Hasib
Mohamed Jaafar; the coffin that was taken to the cemetery in Najaf was more of a token (Saadawi, 2017, p. 33).

In this catastrophic part of the story, the narrator raises the question and the profound concern of whether the division of the body into pieces will be collected properly and meet the soul again or not!

On the contrary, it is not Hadi who plays God by creating a monster, but the explosions and suicide bombers play God. He does not make or resurrect a person who dies naturally but recomposes someone untimely killed by the terrorists. This can be interpreted as an act against the will of God, not what he does, because it must not be humans who put an end to the life of a person since death is ascertained to take place as God wills or as destined by Him. Hence, in one way or another, people may contend that what Hadi does is not playing God but completes what God cannot fulfill or stop in this physical world. According to the Bible, man is created in the image of God (Biblical gateway, 2011, Genesis 1:27-30) but deformed and decomposed by the bombs and terrorists in Baghdad. Therefore, the man intended to maintain this image of God as long as he can live, die naturally, and finally appropriately buried. Hadi, for the amalgamation of the disintegrated Iraqi bodies and the reproduction of the image of God, does not play God but, in contrast, combats suicide bombers who cause disintegrating the bodies as deforming God’s image on Earth as humans are generations of Adam who is, likewise, God’s image according to Qur’an (Melchert, 2011, p. 114). In this view, Hadi is a defender of God on Earth, or he attempts to represent an actual image of God. Therefore, he is innocent in the sense that he does not play God by his creation as the creation is composed of the parts of murdered and blown-up people who were to live yet died untimely. The purpose behind that manner, which seems to be anti-religious, can also be justified as one interpretation from Islamic theology that God is against murdering the innocent to the degree that killing one is comparable to murdering humanity (Al-Mai’dah, 5:32).

Another point regarding the innocence of the creator is that he is reluctant to create a complete person but merely collects the separated body organs and integrates them into souls. Hasib, after he was killed by the explosion at the gate of the hotel, returns by soul and visits the site where he was blown up. He observes a huge hole made by the blast from the suicide bomber. Furthermore, he identifies his burnt shoes but cannot find his body. Then, this soul will start searching for his own body by travelling to many places until it finally arrives at the Valley of Peace in Najaf city. Regarding the lost body, there takes place a conversation between Hasib’s soul and a teenager wearing a red T-shirt, wrist silver bangles, and necklace as such:

“Why are you here?” the boy asked. “You should stay close to your body.”
“It’s disappeared.”
“How did it disappear? You have to find it, or some other body, or else things will end badly for you.”
“What do you mean?”
“I don’t know, but it always ends badly that way.” “Why are you here?”
“This is my grave. My body’s lying underneath. In a few days I won’t be able to get out like this. My body’s decomposing, and I’ll be imprisoned in the grave till the end of
time.” Hasib sat next to him, perplexed. What should he do? No one had told him about these things. What disaster could he expect now?
“Maybe you haven’t really died and you’re dreaming. Or your soul has left your body to go for a stroll and will come back later,” the boy said.
“I hope to God you’re right. I’m not used to this. I’m still young, and I have a daughter, and . . .” (Saadawi, 2017, p. 18).

In that conversation above, the soul of Hasib is informed that he will either find his body or be in danger. The central point of their argument is that bodies and souls have to be inseparably together because if the body is not explored, the soul will be lost forever. If the soul is lost, then the body will be imprisoned in the grave indelibly. Hadi does, in a result, undertake this innocently because he attempts to guarantee the combination of bodies and souls as an act of unification against the terror inflicted on the Iraqi citizens and diverse population.

The innocence of the Creations

The monster was not born a monster; thus, it cannot be burdened with such an attribute as the Great Sin. Instead, it made a monster or daemon as his existence was without any particular identity. The movement of his eyes and legs could be sheer activities or physiological reactions of the process that have no inherent connotations but interpreted as horrible or terrifying in the observer's eye who is its maker. The time when Victor Frankenstein’s creation wakes up is as horrifying in the sight of its beholder as it is in the view of Hadi when he discovers that his craft is gone. The following are the two striking instants that both separately experience the same feeling and reaction when they notice their creations have come into life. Both realizations instigated trembling feelings into Frankenstein and Hadi, respectively:

but now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart. Unable to endure the aspect of the being I had created, I rushed out of the room and continued a long time traversing my bedchamber, unable to compose my mind to sleep (Shelley, 1992, p. 56).
The corpse, too, was gone. He turned everything upside down, then went back to his room and looked in there. His heart was beating faster and faster, and he forgot about the pains that racked his bones. Where on earth had the corpse gone? He stopped in the middle of the courtyard, afraid and confused (Saadawi, 2017, p. 31).

Those occasions encountered by the creators are traumatic, which might infer their innocence. If they had predicted what could happen in such moments and later by killing or murdering others, they would not have been shocked. This traumatic scene leads to paralysis in both of the creators and will constantly impact their future. What they face at that moment is more than an average effect, which is why it could be explained as a traumatic shock or incident as Freud demonstrates:

Every event, every psychical impression is provided with a certain quota of the effect of which the ego divests itself by means of a motor reaction or by associative psychical activity. If the subject is unable or unwilling to get rid of this surplus, the memory of the
impression attains the importance of a trauma and becomes the cause of permanent hysterical symptoms (Fletcher, 2013, p. 30).

Both creatures are manufactured and stitched together from diverse body parts of other people. It is striking that the new compositions do not own bodies belonging to them, but rather many borrowed organs sewed together to complete their entire bodies. Doctor Frankenstein’s scientific ambition occasions his creation into a bizarre fashion because it is animated or given life again through a scientifically mechanical way, unlike the way humans are born. In the same way, Hadi’s creation is other peoples’ chunks and organs but merely combined by him.

First, suppose that man is responsible theologically from birth because it is an intended creation divinely or commanded by God. In that case, it is impossible to put such theological accountability on this human-made man since he is not born the way man is deemed to be born theologically. In the view of the Holy Qur’an, the man was created in this way by God: “Indeed, We created man from a sperm-drop mixture that We may try him; and We made him hearing and seeing” (Noah Surah, 76: 2). In addition, man is, according to the Qur’an, created to be either grateful or disgraceful (76: 4). Concerning Frankenstiens’ creations, they are neither made from fluid nor for such purposes of faithfulness or unfaithfulness to their creators. Another verse claims that man was endowed with moral insights about evil and virtue: Man has been blessed with a sense of ethical understanding. He knows what is good and evil, utilizing a natural inspiration: “By the soul of man and Him who perfected it and inspired it with the knowledge of vice and virtue” (Ash-Shams Surah, 91: 7-8). Therefore, this scientific way of creation does not conflict with both theological theory of creation and the way man is created by the will of God and natural morality in Kant’s perspective that throws light on the inner morality within man as a natural feature of humankind (Walter, 1917, p. 279).

According to the Darwinian Theory, which is opposite to the foundations of theology or natural ethics, man has evolved through natural selection. In this process, it is contended that man is neither made from a drop of water nor willed or created by a divine God. Still, he is reproduced for the differences in the phenotype, which is a biological mechanism that: “The results obtained so far show that, genetically, humans share much in common with other primates and are highly similar to their closest living relatives, the common and bonobo chimpanzees” (Wildman, 2003, p. 7181). Man is, as a result, not divinely created according to this theory. Still, contrastively, he/she is reproduced in a natural selection and can survive as long as it can adapt to the environment that Darwin calls it “Natural Selection; Or Survival for the Fittest” (Darwin, 2009, p. 62). The scientific and unscientific production or animations of Frankenstein’s and Hadi’s creations are entirely different from those mentioned earlier in theological and scientific ways. As a result, one, based on the above theories or doctrines, cannot prove that these creatures are guilty of their offences, such as intimidating or killing others. Unless either God or humans will realize a variant human society made of those creations as scientists to have a moral theory on which one can ethically charge them responsible or guilty. Despite those theological and scientific arguments, this new man who is a product of science is far beyond the makings of God or nature. Therefore, science in the field cannot easily be classified according to the mainstream standards unless it is
scientifically and on the ground of scientific ethics proven guilty. Whereas, in the case of Hadi, it renders more complex since it is neither theological nor scientific.

In the preface of his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Karl Marx states that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but their social existence that determines their consciousness” (Marx, 1904, pp.11-12). He contends that it is the material conditions that one lives by in a community that can shape one’s thoughts and understanding, including its ethics. Both creations could be expected to be innocently monstrous because after they are produced, they automatically become manipulative and more powerful than to be guided or instructed as they have been treated mercilessly as their lives and bodies pertain to such conditions of explosions and instability. Even after they are animated, this life of the disaster-like state dominates, and they are neglected and marginalized for being seen as ugly, huge, and horrible. The awful material conditions and anguishes the creations suffer from eventually formulate their consciousness and behaviours that initially reflect the monstrous reality they experience in their lack of basic needs and demands. For instance, Frankenstein’s creation demanded love, care, food, shelter, and wife from his creator and others, but none were provided. In addition, Hadi’s creation, before his constitution, suffered explosions and untimely death, also abandoned by his creator and society.

Frankenstein’s creature is generally regarded as responsible for the murders of William, Justine, Elizabeth, and Henry Clerval. Despite that, the creation can be considered innocent from the Freudian point of view of guilt. As Sigmund Freud, in his book Civilisation and its Discontents, believes that there are two reasons as the origins for the sense of guilt which may justify that the creature is innocent. Before mentioning the reasons, Freud states that there is no original natural capacity to distinguish good from bad; therefore, according to this statement, one cannot be divinely or naturally endowed or instilled with an ethical ability from birth to differentiate good from the bad. First, he contends that what decides upon something to be virtuous or wicked is an extraneous influence. He, for instance, thinks that one’s dependence on someone else, who is the loved one or someone more powerful than him, may lead to the loss of the help he receives from the other or he will be at the threat of punishment of the other stronger person or authority. Freud names this stage panic of loss of love. Second, this is not a different type of origin of guilt but a higher stage of the process: authority internalization through super-ego formation (Frosh, 1999, pp. 51-52). According to Freud, these two factors are responsible for constructing a sense of guilt and cannot be produced in the creatures because they are not afraid of punishment from others, and by default, they will not internalize it. Meanwhile, a lack of reasons for the formulation of guilt is a lack of reasons for considering them as guilty.

The creation does not love its creator because he is intimidated by him since he opens his eyes, which precipitates a long struggle between them. This indicates that since the creature has been moulded, neither social nor psychological attachment connected them; instead, fear and revenge were the only sources for their connection. Furthermore, the creature is indeed reliant on the creator, but it is not in a way that the creator is stronger than him; as Frankenstein’s creation states “Remember, thou hast made me more powerful than thyself; my height is superior to thine, my joints more supple” (Shelley, 1992, p. 96), but the creature merely needs his architect to
construct a female mate for him as loneliness has terribly affected his life. It haunts him as a horrid
dream even though he begs his creator if pleading him as a God especially when he clearly says
he is his creature and wants to be under his command (Shelley, 1992, p. 96). After he is rejected
and mocked upon by the creator, the creature neither loves nor depends on him as an authority or
a source of punishment anymore. Moreover, as long as these cannot be applied, Freud’s argument
for the sense of guilt in this creature is removed from validity mainly in its capacity to form his
morality. Therefore, the creature cannot be called a monster from Freud's perspective as he cannot
be pleaded guilty.

One of the most salient points of difference between both works is that Frankenstein
admires his ambition to grant life to the dead enthusiastically. At the same time, Hadi never
envisaged a similar horizon because he merely intended to recompose the bodies and save them
from disintegration to give them worthy interment like the rest of those who die naturally and are
worthy of being buried by their surroundings. But this does not change the fact that the moment
the creatures are generated, they are understood to be fulfilling purposes that their creators never
imagined. If the intent in animating the creature on the side of the creator matters, one may think
that Hadi’s product is more innocent because he does not intend to animate his creature but bury
it as a dead body properly. Driven from that, therefore, the junk dealer’s creation is beyond the
will and wish of its creator, and he is astonished when he notices that the body had disappeared as
he exclaimed: “Where on earth had the corpse gone?” (Saadawi, 2017, p. 31)

Conclusion

The notion of innocence is repeated in the creators and the creatures in Shelley’s
Frankenstein and Saadawi’s Frankenstein in Baghdad. It is raised radically due to the diversity of
the controversial arguments and situations that both texts propound. Shelley’s Frankenstein major
characters, according to common scholarly opinion, for instance, is guilty. Based on absolute and
universal judgments, creating or animating the dead is against the natural laws, which eventually
will lead to disastrous consequences. In the meantime, The Iraqi Frankenstein’s creator and
creature are adapted from Shelley’s work, but in a way that could be interpreted in the same
fashion. Therefore, on the contrary, this paper proved that they could be read not merely as
innocent characters but also as fighters for rights and justice. The Iraqi Frankenstein, particularly
for its creation, denies the American military intervention and its atrocities by pursuing justice in
the hands of those Iraqi innocents who had been terrorized and made his body. In this sense, the
paper concluded that Shelley’s conception of innocence in her novel was appropriated in
Saadawi’s Frankenstein in Bagdad, particularly in the problematic grey zones between innocence
and guilt. Despite the big difference in the years of the publications, which is more than two
centuries, the return to the title ‘Frankenstein,’ and particularly one in Baghdad in the middle of
explosions with people torn up into the air and scattered in the streets, can firmly designate to the
appropriation of innocence from the former by the latter.

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